Based on an analysis of the inference rules used, we provide a complete characterization of the situations in which classical and intuitionistic provability coincide. We then examine the relationship of these derivability notions to uniform provability, a restriction of intuitionistic provability that embodies a special form of goal-directedness. We determine, rst, the circumstances in which these relations coincide. Using this result, we identify the richest versions of the so-called abstract logic programming languages in classical and intuitionistic logic. We then study the reduction of classical and, derivatively, intuitionistic provability to uniform provability via the addition to the assumption set of the negation of the formula to be proved. Our focus here is on understanding the situations in which this reduction is achieved. However, our discussions indicate the structure of a proof procedure based on the reduction, a matter also considered explicitly elsewhere.
Introduction
We address three questions pertaining to derivability relations over sequents in this paper. The rst of these concerns the correspondence between classical and intuitionistic provability. It is well known that the former is a stronger relation than the latter: while every intuitionistic proof is also a classical one, there are some sequents that are derivable only in classical logic. However, it is possible in principle to obtain the reverse correspondence by restricting the syntax of formulas considered or the kinds of inference rules used in a classical proof. We examine this possibility here. In particular, we provide a complete characterization at the level of inference rule usage of the situations in which classical provability implies intuitionistic provability. This result has uses in proof search. One possible application is that it permits intuitionistic proof procedures to be employed in settling questions of classical validity in special situations. This approach has bene ts and has also been employed in the past: for example, it underlies the procedure commonly used relative to Horn clause logic with the virtue that proof search at any point is driven by a single goal formula. Another application of our observations is that it supports the use of classical principles in intuitionistic proof search. Thus, the treatment of quanti er dependencies can, in special circumstances, be achieved by a static (dual) Skolemization process instead of a costly dynamic accounting mechanism.
The second question we consider concerns the correspondence between classical and intuitionistic provability on the one hand and uniform provability on the other. Uniform proofs as identi ed in MNPS91] are intuitionistic proofs restricted so as to capture a goaldirectedness in proof search. One reason for interest in this category of proofs is that it provides a framework for interpreting the logical symbols in the formulas being proved as primitives for directing search and the inference rules pertaining to these symbols as speci cations of their search semantics. This viewpoint has been exploited in MNPS91] in describing a proof-theoretic foundation for logic programming. By its very de nition, uniform provability is a less inclusive relation than either classical or intuitionistic provability. However, by a suitable restriction of the context, it is possible to obtain a correspondence between these three relations. We provide, once again, a complete characterization at the level of inference rule usage of the situations in which intuitionistic and uniform provability coincide. When combined with the earlier result, this analysis yields a similar characterization relative to classical logic. As one application of these observations, they enable us to identify the richest possible logic programming languages within classical and intuitionistic logic.
The nal question we consider concerns the reduction of classical and intuitionistic provability to uniform provability. E cient procedures can be designed for searching for uniform proofs. Towards exploiting this possibility, it is worth considering a modi cation of the given formula or sequent in a way that does not alter the original derivability question but, nevertheless, succeeds in reducing it to one of uniform provability. One such modi cation that has been studied in the past is the addition of the negation of the formula that is to be proved to the assumptions NL95, Nad96]. This transformation is sound with respect to classical logic. We characterize the situations in which it also achieves the desired reduction. Since the transformation can be applied to intuitionistic provability without loss of soundness whenever this notion coincides with classical provability, we obtain information indirectly about the reducibility in this case as well.
Logical preliminaries
We will work within the framework of a rst-order logic in this paper. The logical symbols that we assume as primitive are >, ?,^, _, , 9, and 8. The rst two symbols in this collection denote the tautologous and the contradictory propositions, respectively. Note that we consider these logical constants to be distinct from atomic formulas. Negation is a de ned notion in our language, :A being an abbreviation for (A ?).
Notions of derivation that are of interest to us are formalized by sequent calculi. A sequent in our context is a pair of multisets of formulas. Assuming that ? and are its elements, the pair is written as ? ?! and ? and are referred to as its antecedent and succedent, respectively. Such a sequent is an axiom if either > 2 or for some A that is either ? or an atomic formula, it is the case that A 2 ? and A 2 . The rules that may be used in constructing sequent proofs are those that can be obtained from the schemata shown in Figure 1 . In these schemata, ?, and stand for multisets of formulas, B and D stand for formulas, c stands for a constant, x stands for a variable and t stands for a term. The notation B; ? ( ; B) is used here for a multiset containing the formula B whose remaining elements form the multiset ? (respectively, ). Further, expressions of the form t=x]B are used to denote the result of replacing all free occurrences of x in B by t, with bound variables being renamed as needed to ensure the logical correctness of these replacements. There is the usual proviso with respect to the rules produced from the schemata 9-L and 8-R: the constant that replaces c should not appear in the formulas that form the lower sequent. A contraction rule is one that is obtained from either the contr-L or the contr-R schema. All other rules are referred to as operational rules and the formula in the lower sequent that is explicitly a ected by such a rule is called its principal formula. Finally, we refer to contr-L and the operational rules whose principal formulas are in the antecedent of the lower sequent as left rules and to the remaining rules as right rules.
We are interested in three notions of derivability for sequents of the form ? ?! . A C-proof for such a sequent is a derivation obtained by making arbitrary uses of the inference rules. I-proofs are C-proofs in which every sequent has exactly one formula in its succedent.
Notice that, by this stipulation, must itself consist of a single formula. Finally, a uniform : Rules for deriving sequents proof or O-proof is an I-proof in which any sequent that has a non-atomic formula in its succedent occurs only as the lower sequent of an inference rule that introduces the top-level logical symbol of that formula.
In the case that is a single formula, we shall write ?`C , ?`I and ?`O to indicate the existence of, respectively, a C-proof, an I-proof and an O-proof for ? ?! . The rst two notions correspond to classical and intuitionistic provability respectively. The sequent calculi that we have used here to characterize these derivability relations are transparently related to those in Pra65]: we have treated antecedents and succedents as multisets rather than sets but have added the contraction rules to realize arbitrary multiplicity of formulas and, in the intuitionistic setting, we do not permit sequents of the form ? ?! that are not derivable in the system of Pra65]. Uniform provability corresponds to the existence of an O-proof. This notion indicates the possibility for a goal-directedness in the search for a derivation, with the top-level structure of the formula in the succedent controlling the next step in the search at each stage. We observe certain properties of our derivation calculi for classical and intuitionistic logic that will be used in later sections. First, any sequent in which the antecedent and succedent have a common formula has a C-proof and, if the succedent has a single element, an I-proof. Thus, a modi cation to our calculi that considers all such sequents to be axioms does not change the set of provable sequents. The second observation concerns the so-called Cut inference rules that are obtained from the schemata ? 1 ?! 1 ; B B; ? 2 ?! 2 ? 1 ; ? 2 ?! 1 ; 2 Notice that in generating Cut rules in the intuitionistic context, 1 must be instantiated by an empty multiset and 2 by a singleton multiset. Now, these Cut rules are admissible with respect to classical and intuitionistic provability as formulated here, i.e., the same set of sequents have C-proofs and I-proofs even if we allow these additional rules to be used in derivations. This property can be demonstrated by describing a procedure for eliminating occurrences of the Cut rules from any given derivation. An examination of a typical such procedure|for example, the procedure contained in Gen69]|actually allows a stronger conclusion to be drawn: a derivation that uses Cut rules and other inference rules obtained from a restricted subset of the schemata in Figure 1 can be transformed into one in which only rules obtainable from the restricted schemata set appear. Furthermore, this property holds even when the notion of an axiom is strengthened as described earlier in this paragraph.
Building contraction into other inference rules
The contraction rules allow for a pro igate multiplicity of formulas. It is useful to characterize the necessary multiplicity more precisely: such information is relevant to proof search and, further, multiplicity in the succedent is a feature that distinguishes between classical and intuitionistic provability. We identify derived forms of some of the operational rules in this section. These forms incorporate contraction into their structure in a way that permits the contraction rules themselves to be omitted from the calculus.
We consider rst the case for classical provability. These rules are obviously derived ones: a C-proof of the lower sequent of each rule can be obtained from C-proof(s) of the upper sequent(s) by using an instance of the`asterisk-less' version of the schema followed by some number of contraction rules. By a C + -proof let us mean a derivation constructed in a calculus obtained from the one for C-proofs by replacing the rules^-L, _-R, -L, 8-L and 9-R with the ones obtained from the schemata above. It is then easily seen that a sequent has a C-proof if and only if it has a C + -proof.
Let an C -proof be a C + -proof in which contraction rules are not used. Our objective is to show that a sequent has a C -proof whenever it has a C + -proof, i.e., contraction is eliminable from C-proofs under the described strengthening of the^-L, _-R, -L, 8-L and 9-R rules. We do this in a sequence of steps culminating in Theorem 3 below.
Lemma 1 Let ? ?! have a C -proof of height h. If ? 0 ?! 0 and ? ?! are the upper and lower sequents of any single upper sequent rule, then there is a C -proof of height at most h for ? 0 ?! 0 . If ? 0 ?! 0 and ? 00 ?! 00 are the upper sequents and ? ?! is the corresponding lower sequent of any rule with two upper sequents, then both ? 0 ?! 0 and ? 00 ?! 00 have C -proofs of height at most h. All references to rules here are to ones for constructing C -proofs. Proof. The cases for 8-L and 9-R follow from observing that if a C -proof exists for a certain sequent, then there is a derivation of similar structure and identical height for any sequent obtained from it by adding formulas to the antecedent or succedent. A transparent, but tedious, inductive argument based on the heights of C -proofs establishes the remaining cases. These arguments may need some`renaming' steps that are justi ed by the following observation shown, again, by induction on the heights of derivations: if a sequent has a Cproof of height l, then so too does any sequent produced from it by replacing all occurrences of a constant c by another constant a. 2
Let be a multiset of formulas. We use the notation^ to denote the set of formulas appearing in .
Lemma 2 Let ? ?! have a C -proof of height h and let ? 0 and 0 be such that? ?0 and^ ^ 0 . Then ? 0 ?! 0 has a C -proof of height at most h. Proof. By an induction on the height of the derivation for ? ?! . The desired conclusion is obvious if this is an axiom. Otherwise we consider the case for the last rule in the derivation. The argument is straightforward when this is either 8-L or 9-R . In the other cases, we may have to`eliminate' formula occurrences identical to the principal formula from the upper sequent(s) of the last rule. Lemma 1 provides the means for doing this. Some renaming of constants may also be required and this is justi ed in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 1.
2
Theorem 3 A sequent ? ?! has a C-proof if and only if it has a C -proof.
Proof. It su ces to show that ? ?! has a C + -proof if and only if it has a Cproof. The`if' direction is obvious. For the other direction we use an induction on the number of contractions in the C + -proof. If there are none, then we already have a Cproof. Otherwise, we nd a contraction that is the rst one in the derivation in the path from an axiom to the nal sequent. By Lemma 2, this contraction can be dispensed with, yielding a C + -proof with one less contraction.
2 Theorem 3 and Lemma 1 provide the basis for a proof procedure for classical logic that is worth noting. All the rules that may be used in C -proofs that are distinct from the 8-L and 9-R rules have an upper sequent or two upper sequents with fewer logical symbols than those in the lower sequent. We may therefore use these rules repeatedly in a terminating process to reduce a given sequent to a new set of sequents for which derivations must be constructed. If every sequent in the set so produced is an axiom, then we will have established classical provability. If at least one of the new sequents is not an axiom and cannot be the lower sequent of either an 8-L or an 9-R , then the original sequent can have no C-proof. Otherwise each non-axiom sequent is reduced by a simultaneous use of all the 8-L and 9-R rules that are applicable to it and the process is repeated. The procedure as presently stated is not quite practical since the use of an 8-L or an 9-R rule also involves picking the`right' instantiation term. However, this choice can be delayed by introducing an instantiable variable instead and determining bindings for such variables by using uni cation when checking if a sequent is an axiom. Uni cation must, of course, not lead to the constraint on constants in the 9-L and 8-R rules to be violated. The best way to achieve this e ect in the classical setting is to transform the original sequent by a process referred to as Herbrandization in Sha92] that eliminates at the outset all quanti ers that might require a 9-L and 8-R to be used in proof search.
Contraction is applicable only to antecedent formulas in the intuitionistic setting. The essential uses of these rules occur in conjunction with the^-L, 8-L, and -L rules. To realize the e ects of these uses, we may replace the^-L and the 8-L schemata by^-L and 8-L respectively, and -L by the following: We refer to a derivation constructed in the calculus for I-proofs with the indicated replacements for the^-L, 8-L and -L rules as an I + -proof. If contr-L is not used in such a derivation, we shall call it an I -proof. The adequacy of I -proofs in settling questions of intuitionistic provability is shown by a method similar to that used in the classical case. 2. If ? 0 ?! 0 and ? 00 ?! 00 are the upper sequents and ? ?! is the corresponding lower sequent of a rule with two upper sequents that is di erent from -L I , then both ? 0 ?! 0 and ? 00 ?! 00 have I -proofs of height at most h. All references to rules here are to those for constructing I -proofs. Proof. By an inductive argument similar to that for Lemma 1. Proof. By an argument similar to that for Theorem 3.
Once again, Theorem 6 and Lemma 4 have content that can be utilized in structuring proof search in intuitionistic logic. However, there are important di erences from the classical case. First, the static Herbrandization step is not sound in the new setting Nad93, Sha92 ]. An alternative approach that can be used in this case is to treat the 9-L and 8-R rules explicitly in proof search and to employ a dynamic form of Herbrandization to ensure that the required constraints are satis ed by quanti er instantiation terms Fit90, Nad93, Sha92]. Second, the provisos in Lemma 4 imply that the process for reducing sequents must delay consideration of the rules -L I , _-R and 9-R in addition to 8-L .
Further, the order in which these rules are eventually considered may be important and it may be necessary to backtrack over particular orders of reduction.
Correspondence between classical and intuitionistic provability
It is clear from the de nitions that, if ? is a (multi)set of formulas and is a single formula, then ?`I implies ?`C . The converse is not always true. A`canonical' demonstration of this fact is obtained by taking ? to be the empty (multi)set and letting consist of the formula ((q s) q) q. However, the truth of the converse and, hence, the equivalence of classical and intuitionistic provability, can be assured when the syntax of the assumption and conclusion formulas is restricted in certain ways. We describe these syntactic restrictions in this section. Our characterization is based, rst of all, on the inference rules used in a C-proof and is a complete one at this level: we identify four classes of C-proofs determined by the non-use of certain inference rules and show that (a) an I-proof exists for the nal sequent of a C-proof belonging to any of these classes and (b) for each possible way for violating all the restrictions on inference rule usage, there is a C-proof with a corresponding nal sequent for which no I-proof exists. Now, the syntactic structure of the formulas in a given sequent determines the inference rules that can appear in a (cut-free) C-proof of that sequent. This observation enables us to translate the restriction on inference rules into the desired syntactic constraints on formulas.
The following theorem identi es one of the classes of C-proofs that are of interest. Theorem 7 Let ? ?! have a C-proof in which no -R or _-L rule is used. Then, for some G in , it is the case that ? ?! G has an I-proof. In particular, if consists of a single formula, then ? ?! itself has an I-proof. Proof. We use an induction on the heights of C-proofs. If ? ?! is an axiom, then, clearly, there is a G in such that ? ?! G is also an axiom. Thus, the theorem is true for C-proofs of height 1. If the height of the derivation is greater than 1, we consider each possibility for the last rule used. If this is a rule with a single upper sequent, then, by assumption, it must be distinct from an -R. In all the remaining cases, the induction hypothesis combined possibly with a rule obtained from the same schema yields the desired conclusion. If the last rule has two upper sequents, then, since it is distinct from an _-L, it must be either an -L or an^-R. Suppose it is the rst. Then the derivation at the end has the structure ? 0 ?! 1 ; B D; ? 0 ?! 2 B D; ? 0 ?! 1 ; 2 where ? is B D; ? 0 and 1 and 2 constitute a (multiset) partition of . By hypothesis, either ? 0 ?! G has an I-proof for some G in 1 or ? 0 ?! B has an I-proof. In the rst case, it is easily seen that B D; ? 0 ?! G also has an I-proof. In the second case, we use the hypothesis again to observe that for some G in 2 it is the case that D; ? 0 ?! G has an I-proof. These observations used together with an -L rule yields the theorem in this case. A similar argument can be provided when the last rule is an^-R.
2
We translate the restriction on proof rules in Theorem 7 into restrictions on the syntax of formulas. Consider the classes of formulas de ned by the following mutually recursive syntax rules, assuming A represents atomic formulas: G ::= > j ? j A j G^G j G _ G j 8x G j 9x G D ::= > j ? j A j G D j D^D j 9x D j 8x D A sequent in which the succedent consists of a G-formula and the antecedent contains only D-formulas is classically provable just in case it is intuitionistically provable. We observe that the Gand D-formulas de ned here subsume the so-called goal formulas and program clauses of Horn clause logic MNPS91].
There is an auxiliary utility to Theorem 7: it has content relevant to de ning a multiformula succedent sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic. Such a calculus is of interest because it permits a postponement in proof search of decisions about which disjunct of a disjunctive formula in the succedent is to be chosen. Consider the calculus for constructing C -proofs with the _-L and -R rules replaced, respectively, with ones obtained from the following schemata: B; ? ?! F D; ? ?! F B _ D; ? ?! ; F B; ? ?! D ? ?! ; B D A sequent of the form ? ?! in which is a singleton multiset has a derivation in this calculus exactly when it has an I-proof. We may also allow to contain more than one formula by interpreting it as the disjunction of these formulas. We note, however, that the modi cation to the _-L schema is essential even under such an interpretation for quanti cational logic: without this modi cation, the sequent 8x (p(x) _ q) ?! (8x p(x)) _ q would, for example, have a derivation even though it has no I-proof.
The following theorem identi es a second interesting class of C-proofs. Theorem 8 Let ? be a multiset of formulas and let B 1 ; : : :; B n be formulas such that ? ?! B 1 ; : : :; B n has a C-proof in which no -R or 8-R rule is used. Then the sequent ? ?! B 1 _ : : : _ B n has an I-proof. In the case that n = 1, ? ?! B 1 has an I-proof.
Proof. This theorem can be proved, once again, by an induction on the heights of C-proofs. We do not provide an explicit proof here, noting only that an argument that is similar to, but simpler than, that for Theorem 9 below su ces. In particular, a complication arises in the (inductive) proof of Theorem 9 from having to consider an 8-R as the last rule in the C-proof of ? ?! B 1 ; : : :; B n . The premise of the present theorem rules out this possibility. There is an additional case that has to be considered here in that an 8-L rule could be the last one used. However, the argument for this case is a relatively simple one.
Following earlier lines, we can rephrase Theorem 8 in terms of a restriction on the syntax of formulas. Consider the following classes of formulas, assuming, again, that A represents atomic formulas:
If ? is a (multi)set of D-formulas and F is a G-formula, then ?`C F only if ?`I F. The classes of Gand D-formulas described by the present rules constitute a generalization of similarly named classes in NL95] and have been studied there as the basis for disjunctive logic programming LMR92].
A third category of C-proofs is identi ed in the following theorem. Theorem 9 Let ? be a multiset of formulas and let B 1 ; : : :; B n be formulas such that ? ?! B 1 ; : : :; B n has a C-proof in which no -R or 8-L rule is used. Then the sequent ? ?! B 1 _ : : : _ B n has an I-proof. In the case that n = 1, ? ?! B 1 has an I-proof. Proof. It is convenient to prove the theorem assuming derivation calculi with the stronger notion of axioms described in Section 2, i.e., ones in which any sequent whose antecedent and succedent have a common formula is considered an axiom. Further, we show a stronger property than that required: If ? ?! B 1 ; : : :; B n has a C-proof in which no -R or 8-L rule is used, then ? ?! B 1 _ : : : _ B n has an I-proof in which no 8-L rule is used. We prove this property by means of an induction on the height of the C-proof for ? ?! B 1 ; : : :; B n .
The base case corresponds to ? ?! B 1 ; : : :; B n being an axiom. In this case, we can construct an I-proof of ? ?! B 1 _ : : : _ B n by using a sequence of _-R rules below a suitably chosen axiom. Note that no 8-L rule appears in this derivation.
For the inductive step, we consider the various possibilities for the last rule used in the derivation. The argument is straightforward for all permitted left rules, i.e., ones that are distinct from 8-L, in which the succedent is identical in the upper and lower sequents|we invoke the induction hypothesis and use an instance of the same rule schema to get an I-proof for ? ?! B 1 _ : : : _ B n , and we note that this derivation must not contain an 8-L rule occurrence.
The only remaining possibility for a left rule is that it is an -L. In this case, the derivation at the end has the structure ? 0 ?! 1 ; F D; ? 0 ?! 2 F D; ? 0 ?! 1 ; 2 where ? is F D; ? 0 and 1 and 2 constitute some partition of B 1 ; : : :; B n . The argument follows the pattern of that for the other left rules in the case that 1 is empty. We therefore assume that it is nonempty. We also assume that the nal sequent in the derivation has exactly two formulas in the succedent and that 1 is B 1 and 2 is B 2 ; these assumptions are not critical, and may be dispensed with in a more detailed argument. 
We can, as usual, rephrase Theorem 9 in terms of a restriction on the syntax of formulas.
Once again, consider the following classes of formulas, assuming that A represents atomic formulas:
If ? is a (multi)set of D-formulas and F is a G-formula, then ?`C F only if ?`I F.
The following theorem identi es a fourth, and nal, class of C-proofs that are of interest from the perspective of this section.
Theorem 10 Let ? be a multiset of formulas and let B be a formula such that ? ?! B has a C-proof in which no -L, _-R or 9-R rule is used. Then ? ?! B has an I-proof. Proof. We claim that if ? ?! B has a C-proof in which on -L, _-R or 9-R rule is used, then this sequent also has a C -proof in which no -L , _-R or 9-R rule is used. Towards seeing this, we rst make the easy observation that, under the given assumption, ? ?! B must have a C + -proof in which the latter rules do not appear. Now, an introspection on the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 reveals that the C -proofs mentioned in these lemmas may be quali ed to be ones in which the -L , _-R and 9-R rules do not appear. Finally, an argument similar to that provided for Theorem 3 allows us to conclude that ? ?! B has a C -proof that does not contain any -L , _-R or 9-R rules.
The claim easily yields the theorem: Every sequent in the C -proof of restricted form must have exactly one formula in the succedent. Each occurrence of an^-L and 8-L rule in this derivation can be eliminated in favor of a contr-L rule paired with some number of^-L and 8-L rules, respectively, to produce a C-proof. The number of formulas in the succedent of each sequent remains unchanged by this transformation and so the C-proof that is produced is also an I-proof.
2 Towards rephrasing Theorem 9 in terms of a restriction on formulas, we de ne the following classes of formulas, assuming, as usual, that A represents atomic formulas:
G ::= > j ? j A j G^G j D G j 8x G D ::= > j ? j A j D^D j D _ D j 9x D j 8x D:
It follows from the theorem that if ? is a (multi)set of D-formulas and F is a G-formula, then ?`C F only if ?`I F.
Theorem 11 Theorems 7-10 provide a complete characterization at the level of proof rules of the conditions under which classical and intuitionistic provability are equivalent. In other words, there is a sequent with a singleton succedent that has a C-proof but no I-proof corresponding to each way of violating all the restrictions on inference rule usage described in the mentioned theorems.
Proof. C-proofs may be categorized into those that do and those that do not contain occurrences of the -R rules.
We consider rst the collection of C-proofs in which the -R rules are not used. To violate the restrictions on proof rule usage contained in Theorems 7-10, a derivation of this kind must contain at least one occurrence of an _-L, an 8-R and an 8-L rule and of either an -L, an _-R or a 9-R rule. We list sequents below that have C-proofs satisfying each of these requirements and note that none of these has an I-proof:
(8x p(x)) q; 8x (p(x) _ q) ?! q 8x (p(x) _ q) ?! (8x p(x)) _ q 8x (r(x; a) _ r(x; b)) ?! 9y 8x r(x; y).
We assume in these sequents that q is a proposition symbol, p is a unary predicate symbol, r is a binary predicate symbol and a and b are constants.
A C-proof in which an -R rule is used must also contain an occurrence of one of the -L, _-R and 9-R rules in order to violate the restrictions described in Theorems 7-10. The following sequents have C-proofs satisfying each of these requirements:
In these sequents, we assume additionally that s is a proposition symbol and that f is a unary function symbol. It is easily seen that none of these sequents has an I-proof, thus verifying the theorem even in this case.
5 Relationship to uniform provability
We consider now the relationship between classical and intuitionistic provability on the one hand and uniform provability on the other. Our analysis covers two kinds of questions. First, we examine the restrictions in the syntax of formulas that are necessary to ensure a coextensiveness between these di erent proof relations. Following this, we consider the reduction of classical provability to uniform provability in situations where these relations are not coextensive.
Correspondence with uniform provability
Our rst goal is to circumscribe the sequents for which the existence of an I-proof implies the existence of an O-proof. Since an O-proof is a special case of an I-proof, we can combine this characterization with the results of the previous section to obtain a similar relationship between classical and uniform provability. The following theorem provides the desired circumscription in terms of the inference rules used in the I-proof. Theorem 12 Let ? be a multiset of formulas and let G be a formula. If the sequent ? ?! G has an I-proof in which 1. either no _-L rule or no _-R and no 9-R rule is used, and 2. either no 9-L rule or no 9-R rule is used, then it also has a uniform proof. Moreover, this characterization is tight in that, for each possible way of violating these restrictions, there is a sequent with an I-proof but no uniform proof.
Proof. The rst part of the theorem is an immediate consequence of the permutability properties of inference rules in intuitionistic sequent calculi established, for instance, in Kle52]: except in the cases mentioned, a right rule can be moved below a left rule in an Iproof, thereby permitting rules to be reordered to produce an O-proof. We sketch an explicit argument for the reader unfamiliar with these permutability results. Observe rst that if an I-proof exists for a sequent, then there is also one with the following characteristic: every logical symbol that appears in the succedent of a sequent in this derivation is introduced by an inference rule appearing above that sequent. The given I-proof may not already satisfy this requirement only if it contains an occurrence of a ?-R rule, but in this case the derivation can be easily adjusted to produce one of the desired kind. Now suppose we are given an I-proof of this kind that is not a uniform proof. Then there must be a rst sequent in a path from an axiom to the nal sequent whose derivation culminates with a right rule followed by a left rule. By considering each possibility for the right and left rule in turn, it can be seen that the order of these rules can be inverted except in the following cases: when the left rule is an _-L and the right rule is either an _-R or an 9-R or when the left rule is an 9-L and the right rule is an 9-R. Further, this reordering can be achieved by using derivations appearing above the sequent in question, i.e., without introducing any new violations to the requirements of uniform provability. Thus, the process just described reduces the total number of these violations and its repeated application will eventually yield a uniform proof assuming, of course, that the deviant sequences of left and right rules do not appear in the original I-proof.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we list a suitable set of sequents: p(a) _ p(b) ?! 9x p(x), q _ s ?! s _ q, and 9x (p(x)^q) ?! 9x p(x).
We assume here that q and s are proposition symbols, p is a predicate symbol and a and b are constants. None of these sequents has a uniform proof. However all of them have I-proofs: the rst has one in which an _-L and an 9-R rule are used, the second has one in which an _-L and an _-R rule are used and the last has one in which an 9-L and an 9-R rule are used.
2
The notion of uniform provability is useful in identifying logical languages that provide a basis for programming MNPS91]. In particular, letting D and G denote collections of formulas and`denote a chosen proof relation, an abstract logic programming language is de ned to be a triple hD; G;`i such that, for all nite subsets P of D and all G 2 G, P`G if and only if P`O G. In the programming interpretation of such a triple, elements of D function as program clauses and elements of G serve as queries or goals. The virtue of this de nition is that it supports a broad interpretation of logic programming based on a duality in the meaning of logical symbols: on the one hand, these symbols have a declarative reading given by the proof relation`and, on the other, they are accorded a search-related interpretation given by the rules for introducing each of them on the right in sequent proofs. An interesting question is that of how rich the syntax of program clauses and goals can be in the cases where`is interpreted as classical or intuitionistic provability. Before answering this question, we note that these formulas must contain certain syntactic components in order to be useful for programming: the procedural interpretation of program clauses relies on universal quanti cation and implications being permitted at the top-level in these formulas and outermost existential quanti cation is important in goals in making sense of the result of nding a derivation. In light of Theorem 12, the second requirement precludes outermost occurrences of disjunction and existential quanti cation in program clauses. Thus, if`is interpreted as intuitionistic provability, the collection of Gand Dformulas given by the following syntax rules represent the largest possible classes for goals and program clauses: G ::= > j ? j A j G^G j G _ G j D G j 8x G j 9x G D ::= > j ? j A j G D j D^D j j 8x D We assume, as before, that A represents atomic formulas in these rules. The only essential di erence between the abstract logic programming language given by these classes of formulas and intuitionistic provability and the language of hereditary Harrop formulas studied in MNPS91] is that the logical constant ? is permitted to appear here in goals and program clauses.
In the case that classical provability is used instead to clarify the declarative semantics, further restrictions have to be placed on formulas to ensure coextensiveness with intuitionistic provability, a prelude to coextensiveness with uniform provability. By virtue of Theorem 7, one way to achieve this e ect is to exclude the case involving implication from the syntax rule for G-formulas above. The language that results from this restriction is closely related to the Horn clause logic that underlies the language Prolog: in particular, it extends Horn clause logic as presented in MNPS91] by including universal quanti cation in goals and allowing ? to appear in goals and program clauses.
However, it is not necessary to exclude implications in goals even when the chosen proof relation is classical provability. 1 What the examples used in the proof of Theorem 11 show is that implications must not appear negatively in program clauses or embedded within disjunctions or existential quanti cations in goals. We can modify the de nition of Gand D-formulas as follows to satisfy these requirements: G ::= G 0 j D G 0 j G^G j 8x G G 0 ::= > j ? j A j G 0^G0 j G 0 _ G 0 j D G 0 j 8x G 0 j 9x G 0 D ::= > j ? j A j G 0 D j D^D j j 8x D Using Theorems 7 and 12 and the easy observations that (a) ? ?! F 1^F2 has a C-proof only if ? ?! F 1 and ? ?! F 2 also have C-proofs, (b) ? ?! F 1 F 2 has a C-proof only if F 1 ; ? ?! F 2 also has one, and (c) ? ?! 8x F has a C-proof only if, for some constant c not appearing in ? or F, ? ?! c=x]F also has one, it can be seen that these de nitions in fact yield an abstract logic programming language. Moreover, this is the largest such language based on classical logic that also meets the mentioned requirements for programming.
Reduction to uniform provability
The succedent formula can be used to direct the search for a uniform proof for a sequent in a fairly deterministic fashion. By exploiting this fact, it is possible to de ne e cient proof procedures for logical languages that have a derivability relation that is coextensive with uniform provability. This idea has been used previously relative to abstract logic programming languages; see, for instance, Mil91, Nad93]. Now, even in situations where the proof relation of interest deviates from uniform provability, it may still be possible to utilize the latter notion in structuring proof search. For instance, it may be possible to modify the sequent whose derivability status is to be veri ed in some predetermined and sound way to produce a new sequent that has a derivation in the relevant sense just in case it has an O-proof. One approach of this kind that has been considered in the past in conjunction with classical logic NL95, Nad96]. In this approach, the attempt to prove a sequent of the form ? ?! F is transformed into an attempt to prove F ?; ? ?! F instead. As we see below, the indicated augmentation of the antecedent can be made implicit by being built into new inference rules. The virtue of the resulting derivation system is that it provides the basis for a goal-directed proof procedure with the characteristic that the attempt to prove the original goal is restarted with a modi ed set of premises at certain points in the search Gab85, GR93, LR91, Nad96].
tight constraint on the syntax of formulas.
A crucial requirement in using this method is that the described augmentation of the sequent reduce the question of classical provability to that of uniform provability. Towards understanding the applicability of this method, we wish to circumscribe the sequents for which this reduction is actually achieved. We begin by observing that the overall approach is actually sound:
Lemma 13 Let ? be a multiset of formulas and let F be a formula. Then F ?; ?`C F if and only if ?`C F.
Proof. This follows easily from the admissibility of the Cut inference rules and the fact that ?! (F ?) _ F has a C-proof. Theorem 14 Let ? be a multiset of formulas and let F be a formula such that ? ?! F has a C-proof. Assuming a knowledge only of the rules used in the C-proof, the existence of an I-proof for F ?; ? ?! F is assured if and only if 1. no 8-R rule is used in the C-proof of ? ?! F , or 2. the existence of an I-proof for ? ?! G itself can be assured. Proof. It is shown in Nad96] that, if ? ?! F has a C-proof in which no 8-R rule is used, then F ?; ? ?! F has an I-proof. It is also evident that F ?; ? ?! F has an I-proof if ? ?! F has one. Thus, it only remains to be shown that, corresponding to each way of violating both conditions, there is a sequent that has a C-proof but whose augmented version does not have an I-proof.
By assumption, we need to consider only those situations in which an 8-R rule is used in the C-proof. Now, our analysis breaks up into two parts, depending on whether or not a -R rule appears in the C-proof. Suppose, rst, that it does not. Then, by Theorems 7-10, to ensure that ? ?! F does not have an I-proof, the C-proof must contain occurrences of both an _-L and an 8-L rule and of one of the -L, _-R and 9-R rules. The following sequents have C-proofs respectively meeting each of these requirements: 8x 8y (p(x) _ q(y)); (8x p(x)) (8y q(y)) ?! 8y q(y), 8x 8y (p(x) _ q(y)) ?! (8x p(x)) _ (8y q(y)), 8x (r(x; a) _ r(x; b)) ?! 9y 8x r(x; y).
We assume that p and q are unary predicate symbols, that r is a binary predicate symbol and that a and b are constants in these sequents. Now, denoting the antecedent by ? and the formula in the succedent by F in each case, it can be seen that in none of these cases does F ?; ? ?! F have an I-proof.
To complete the argument, we consider the situation in which an -R rule appears in the C-proof. In this case, for ? ?! F not to have an I-proof, one of the -L, _-R and 9-R must also appear in the C-proof. But then consider the following sequents: 8x ((p(x) ?) ?) ?! 8x p(x), ?! 8x (p(x) _ (p(x) s)), and ?! 9y 8x (p(y) p(x)). In these sequents we assume additionally that s is a proposition symbol. Now, these sequents have C-proofs respectively meeting each of the requirements. However, it can be easily seen that none of the augmented versions of these sequents have an I-proof.
2 It remains only to characterize the situations in which the augmentation su ces to reduce intuitionistic provability to uniform provability. Part of this task has already been performed in Nad96]. In particular, it has been shown there that if G ?; ? ?! G has an I-proof in which no 8-R rule is used, then this sequent also has an O-proof. In determining the other situations in which a similar property holds, we nd it convenient to use a modi ed version of our calculus for constructing I-proofs. Towards this end, we consider the following inference rules that are parameterized by a speci c formula G:
We assume that B, D and F are schema variables for formulas in these rules and that denotes a multiset of formulas. These rules are obviously derived ones relative to the calculus for constructing I-proofs in the case that contains the formula G ?. Moreover, every use that is made of the \additional" formula G ? in an I-proof of G ?; ? ?! G can actually be transformed into a use of a res G rule. Thus, in constructing an I-proof of a sequent of the form G ?; ? ?! G, we may use these rules and also make the augmentation of the antecedent implicit by strengthening the proviso on the 9-L and 8-R rules to disallow the use of constants appearing in G. We are actually interested in a calculus that results from the above modi cations and the removal of the _-L rule. Let us refer to derivations constructed within this calculus as I G -proofs. We then have the following observation. Proof. By an I 0 G -proof let us mean a derivation that does not contain any 8-L or -R rules and that would be an I G -proof except for the fact that some number of _-L rules appear in it. From the premises of the lemma, it follows that ? ?! G has an I 0 G -proof. Thus, it su ces to show that an I 0 G -proof of ? ?! G with some _-L rules in it can be transformed into one that does not contain any _-L rules. We do this by an inductive argument based on the number of _-L rules in the given I 0 G -proof. We shall assume in this argument that this derivation satis es two additional properties: (a) the antecedent(s) of the upper sequent(s) of each left operational rule contains (contain) an occurrence of the principal formula of that rule and (b) each 9-L and 8-R rule uses a distinct constant all of whose occurrences are restricted to the part of the derivation appearing above that rule. We may have to introduce some contr-L rules into the original derivation to make sure that the rst requirement is satis ed and a consistent renaming of some constants su ces to ensure the second property. These`preprocessing' steps may be applied with impunity since they do not increase the number of _-L rules in the derivation and they also produce something that is itself an I 0 G -proof of the same nal sequent.
An explicit argument is needed only in the case that at least one _-L rule appears somewhere in the derivation. Suppose this happens to be of the form B; ?! F D; ?! F B _ D; ?! F We may replace this with an _-L G rule, thereby reducing the number of occurrences of _-L rules, provided we can produce an I G -proof for D; ?! G. It su ces, for this purpose, to exhibit an I 0 G -proof for D; ?! G with fewer _-L rules in it than in the given derivation for ? ?! G. Such a derivation can be constructed based on the one for ? ?! G as follows: we retain unchanged the portion of the latter derivation above the sequent D; ?! F and, for the portion below this sequent, we elide all the left rules di erent from _-L G rules above whose right upper sequent D; ?! F appears, we erase the portion of the derivation up to and including the left upper sequent of all remaining _-L G rules and rename these to res G rules, we replace each right rule with an instance of the same schema but with D; as the antecedent of the upper and lower sequents, and we replace the derivation above the`other' upper sequent of an^-R rule with one that uses the same rule schemata but with suitably modi ed antecedents. Clearly, this construction eliminates at least one _-L rule from the given I 0 G -proof. However, some care is needed in ensuring that it yields something that is indeed an I 0 G -proof. First, each 8-R rule below D; ?! F in the new`derivation' uses the same constant as is used in the derivation of ? ?! G and we must verify that this is acceptable. We see this to be the case by observing that this constant cannot appear in D; since the given derivation does not contain occurrences of either the 8-L or the -R rules. Second, it must be possible to construct the derivation above the other upper sequent of an^-R rule as described; in particular, all the 8-R and left rules needed in this construction must be legitimate ones. Our assumptions concerning the constants used in 9-L and 8-R rules and the relationship between the antecedents of the upper and lower sequents of each left operational rule in the given I 0 G -proof ensure that this is the case.
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We now relativize the notion of a uniform proof to our modi ed calculus. In particular, let an O G -proof be an I G -proof with the following characteristic: if there is a sequent in this proof whose succedent contains a non-atomic formula, then that sequent occurs as the lower sequent of an inference rule that introduces the top-level logical symbol of that formula. The following may then be observed:
Lemma 16 If ? ?! G has a I G -proof in which no 8-L or -R rules appear, then it has an O G -proof. Proof. By the nonuniformity measure of a left rule in an I G -proof let us mean the count of right rules pertaining to logical symbols in the succedent of the lower sequent of the left rule that appear above the left rule in the derivation. Further, let the nonuniformity measure of the I G -proof itself be de ned to be the sum of the nonuniformity measures of the left operational rules contained in it. Now, let us refer to an I G -proof in which no 8-L or -R rules appear as an I 0 G -proof. We claim then that if ? ?! G has an I 0 G -proof, then it has one whose nonuniformity measure is 0. We prove this claim by induction on the measure. We shall assume in our argument that the given derivation satis es two additional properties: (a) the antecedent(s) of the upper sequent(s) of each left operational rule contains (contain) an occurrence of the principal formula of that rule and (b) each 9-L and 8-R rule uses a distinct constant all of whose occurrences are restricted to the part of the derivation appearing above that rule. We may have to apply the preprocessing steps discussed in the proof of Lemma 15 to ensure that these requirements are met, but we can do this without changing the nonuniformity measure of the derivation.
In order to establish the claim, it is su cient to show that if ? ?! G has an I 0 G -proof with nonzero nonuniformity measure, then it has one with a smaller such measure. From the assumption it follows that the given derivation contains a left operational rule with right operational rules pertaining to the succedent of its lower sequent appearing above it. We focus on a left rule that is the rst along some path in the derivation to have this characteristic. It is easily seen that a contr-L rule can be moved above any right rule in an I G -proof. Thus, we may assume that the left operational rule of interest appears immediately after the relevant right rule in the given I 0 G -proof. Our objective, now, is to show that these two rules can be reordered in a way that decreases the nonuniformity measure of the overall derivation.
A simple transformation can be used to achieve this e ect when the left rule is not an 9-L or the right rule is not an 9-R. We illustrate this by considering one particular case:
that when the left rule is an -L and the right rule is an^-R. In this case, the subderivation at the end has the following structure: at the end. The nonuniformity measure of the new subderivation is obviously less than that of the earlier one, and it also does not have any new occurrences of right rules that could increase the nonuniformity measure of left operational rules appearing later in the derivation. Thus, the desired e ect is achieved by this transformation.
For the only remaining case, let us suppose that it occurs in a subderivation that has the structure c=x]B; ?! t=y]D 9-R c=x]B; ?! 9y D 9-L 9x B; ?! 9y D at the end. Now, it can be shown that c=x]B; ?! G has an I 0 G -proof of smaller nonuniformity measure than that of the one for ? ?! G; as in the proof of Lemma 15, we construct such a derivation essentially by mimicking the structure of the given I 0 G -proof of ? ?! G and note that at least one occurrence of an 9-L rule|the one shown above|that makes a nonzero contribution to the nonuniformity measure is eliminated in the process.
From the induction hypothesis, it follows then that c=x]B; ?! G has an I 0 G -proof of zero nonuniformity measure. The proviso on a 9-L rule ensures that c does not occur in B, or G. Given this, we may also assume that c does not also appear in t, for, if it does, we simply rename it to a new constant c 0 that satis es this additional requirement and use c 0 =x]B; ?! G and its corresponding derivation in the rest of the argument.
Using the known derivation for c=x]B; ?! G, we may restructure the I 0 G -proof for 9x B; ?! 9y D so that it has the form c=x]B; ?! G res G c=x]B; ?! t=y]D 9-L 9x B; ?! t=y]D 9-R 9x B; ?! 9y D at the end. This derivation obviously has a nonuniformity measure less than that of the earlier one and using it instead also decreases the nonuniformity measure of the overall derivation.
We have thus shown that ? ?! G has an I 0 G -proof, and, hence, an I G -proof, of zero nonuniformity measure. By moving contr-L rules above any immediately preceding right rules in this derivation, we obtain a structure that would be an O G -proof if an additional property holds: the succedent of the lower sequent of every ?-R and res G rule is an atomic formula. This may not be true at the outset, but a simple transformation process ensures that it eventually is. To illustrate this process, suppose that there is a res G rule in the derivation whose lower sequent has the formula F 1^F2 as its succedent. Now, there must be a last sequent following this one in the derivation that has the same formula as its succedent.
Suppose this sequent is ?! F 1^F2 . By imitating the derivation of this sequent, we obtain I G -proofs for ?! F 1 and ?! F 2 . Further, using these I G -proofs, we may replace the derivation of ?! F 1^F2 by one that has the structure ?! F 1 ?! F 2^-R ?! F 1^F2 at the end without changing the nonuniformity measure of the overall I G -proof. The virtue of this transformation is that the res G rule in the original derivation is replaced by ones whose lower sequent have formulas with fewer logical symbols in their succedents. In a more detailed presentation, we associate with each I G -proof of zero nonuniformity measure a multiset of numbers that count the logical symbols in the formulas that appear as the succedents of the lower sequents of ?-R and res G rules used in the derivation. We then use the above form of argument in an induction over the multiset ordering induced by the usual ordering on natural numbers Der82] to show that ? ?! G has an I G -proof of zero nonuniformity measure and in which the succedent of the lower sequent of every ?-R and res G rule is atomic.
The following theorem states the desired relationship between intuitionistic and uniform provability.
Theorem 17 Suppose that there is an I-proof for a sequent of the form G ?; ? ?! G satisfying one of the following restrictions on rule usage:
1. No 8-R rule is used. 2. No _-R or no _-L rule is used and, in addition, no 9-R or no _-L and 9-L rule is used.
no 8-L and -R rule is used.
Then there is an O-proof for the same sequent. Furthermore, this characterization is complete in the sense that there is a sequent of the required form that has an I-proof but no O-proof corresponding to each way of violating all the restrictions on inference rule usage. Proof. The su ciency of the rst restriction on inference rule usage is shown in Nad96] and that of the second restriction follows immediately from Theorem 12. The su ciency of the third restriction is a consequence of Lemmas 15 and 16 and the observation that an O G -proof for ? ?! G can be translated into a uniform proof for G ?; ? ?! G.
We now show the completeness of the characterization. To begin with, the only situations we need to consider are those in which an 8-R rule is used in the I-proof. Now, we may partition these situations based on whether an _-R or a 9-R rule has been used. Considering the former possibility rst, we note that in these situations an _-L rule and one of the 8-L and -R rules must also have been used. The following sequents have I-proofs respectively satisfying these requirements on rule usage: (8y (r(b; y) _ r(a; y))) ?; 8y (r(a; y) _ r(b; y)) ?! 8y (r(b; y) _ r(a; y)), and (8y ((r(b; y) _ r(a; y)) (r(a; y) _ r(b; y)))) ? ?! 8y ((r(b; y) _ r(a; y)) (r(a; y) _ r(b; y)));
we assume that r is a binary predicate symbol and a and b are constants in these sequents.
It is easily seen that neither of these sequents has an O-proof, as is required.
To nish the proof, we have to consider those situations in which the violation of the restrictions arises from the use of a 9-R rule. In these cases, one of the _-L and 9-L rules and also one of the 8-L and -R rules must also have been used. We list four sequents of the required form that have I-proofs respectively satisfying these requirements:
(8y 9x r(x; y)) ?; 8y (r(a; y) _ r(b; y)) ?! 8y 9x r(x; y), (8y ((r(a; y) _ r(b; y)) 9x r(x; y))) ? ?! 8y ((r(a; y) _ r(b; y)) 9x r(x; y)), (8y 9x r(x; y)) ?; 8y 9x r(x; y) ?! 8y 9x r(x; y), and (8y ((9x r(x; y)) 9x r(x; y))) ? ?! 8y ((9x r(x; y)) 9x r(x; y)).
Once again, it can be veri ed that none of these sequents has an O-proof.
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Combining Theorems 14 and 17, we see that if ? ?! G has a C-proof satisfying one of the following restrictions on rule usage, then there must also be an O-proof for G ?; ? ?! G: (i) no 8-R rule is used, (ii) no -L, _-R and 9-R rule is used, and (iii) no -R and 8-L rule is used. These restrictions can be recast in an obvious manner into ones on the syntax of formulas in the sequent for which a derivation is to be constructed and are, in fact, more useful in this form. Of all these conditions, the one that is most easily ensured in practice is that there be no universal quanti ers occurring negatively in the antecedent and positively in the succedent|any sequent can be transformed in one that is equivalent from the perspective of classical provability and that satis es this additional property through the use of Herbrand functions Sha92]. A proof procedure based on these observations is described in Nad96] and connections with other previously presented procedures is also discussed there. We observe, nally, that the results of this section are also relevant from the perspective of structuring proof search in intuitionistic logic. In particular, the augmentation of sequents is sound with respect to intuitionistic provability whenever the structure of the sequent ensures a coincidence with classical provability. Such an augmentation may then be used to obtain a reduction to uniform provability. One interesting situation in which this approach may be utilized is that when implications and universal quanti cations do not appear positively in the succedent and negatively in the antecedent of a sequent. This situation epitomizes disjunctive logic programming and is discussed in more detail in NL95].
Conclusion
We have explored the interrelationships between the notions of classical, intuitionistic and uniform provability in this paper. We have also examined the relevance of our results to proof search in classical and intuitionistic logic and to identifying logic programming languages. We believe there are other applications to our observations as well, especially to our characterization of the correspondence between classical and intuitionistic provability. Another matter that is only partially studied here and that is worthy of further consideration is the usefulness of uniform provability in designing proof procedures for intuitionistic logic.
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